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Co-operative Values, Institutions and 
Free Riding in Australia
Can It Learn from Canada?
DAVID PEETZ1*
While there is a strong logic favouring co-operation, it faces 
a central problem: the “free rider” or “cheat.” Collectives find 
ways of promoting norms of solidarity and seek regulation to 
prevent free riding. Around two-fifths of Australian employees 
covered by collective agreements are free-riding non-members. 
Evidence suggests that the recent growth of free riding reflects 
institutional changes and not the decline of co-operative values 
and the ascendancy of individualism. The Canadian solution to the 
cheating problem, which is the Rand formula, inspired Australian
unions to introduce (excessive) “agency fees” into collective 
 agreements. These were eventually stopped by the state. Alternative 
models include “social obligation fees”—provisions for employees 
covered by the agreement to make a contribution to a voluntary 
organization of their choice.
Industrial citizenship implies both rights and responsibilities for citizens. 
These include the right to participate in collective activity such as bargaining, 
and the need to behave with responsibility towards fellow  members of the 
collective or group. One of the central problems in co- operative, collective 
behaviour has been the problem of free riding. This article will consider 
co-operative values, free riding and institutional change in the context of 
Australia, where the incidence of free riding has increased in recent years. 
It will also examine the contrast with Canada, where the Rand model for 
dealing with the free-rider problem was introduced, and briefly provided a 
model for emulation in Australia. I start by introducing the general context 
of collectivism and identify where co-operative values (including  reciprocity 
– PEETZ, D., School of Industrial Relations, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, 
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and altruism) and free riding sit in a collectivist framework. I then look 
at the measurement of free riding and the general pattern of free riding in 
Australia. Consideration then turns to whether there is Australian evidence 
of a decline in co-operative values which might promote an increase in free 
riding, or whether institutional changes are responsible. I then look at how 
free riding has been dealt with or otherwise in the Canadian and Australian 
contexts, including some policy options for the future.
COLLECTIVISM AND CO-OPERATIVE VALUES
Collectivism refers to the way in which interests, orientations and 
behaviours are based on predominantly group rather than predominantly 
individual reference points. Collective interests, orientations and behaviours 
occur in all sorts of contexts: in community activities, in business, in politics, 
in industrial relations, in the home and family, even in nature. Before 
 specifically discussing co-operative values, I will very briefly locate them in 
the context of a broader framework for thinking about collectivism (Peetz, 
2006), which builds on various bodies of thought including mobilization 
theory (Kelly, 1998; Kelly and Badigannavar, 2004; Tilly, 1978), theories 
of efficacy (Bandura, 1997), social capital theory (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 
2000) and theories of the evolution of co-operation (Kropotkin, 1902; 
Sober and Wilson, 1998; Stewart, 2000). In order for collectivism to exist, 
there must be some collective needs or interest (Tilly, 1978)—needs that 
are common to a potential group and that therefore help define that group. 
These needs should be expressed across enough members of the group to 
generate a sense of common grievance (Gall et al., 2001). Second, for col-
lectivism to flourish, there must be collectivist attitudes amongst potential 
members of the collective. These are constituted by an awareness amongst 
members of the group that they have something significant in common 
and that they have the capacity and intent to act co-operatively. Frege 
(1997) suggested six key dimensions to collectivist attitudes but these can 
be amalgamated to produce three main elements: awareness of a common
social identity; shared co-operative values—the focus of this article; and a 
sense of collective efficacy (a belief in a group’s power) amongst members 
of the group. Third, for collective actions to occur, the group must have a 
coordinating capacity (Lévesque and Murray, 2002), that is connections or 
networks between members of the group (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 2000) 
and mobilizers (organizers) of those members (also referred to as “leaders” 
or “managers”: Kelly, 1998; Stewart, 2000). These three elements lead 
to collective action. The collective power of the group is then a function 
of how this collective action is mediated by the institutional responses 
and environmental circumstances, that is by the behaviour of employers, 
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governments, courts and tribunals, and the economy, which help shape the 
balance of power between the collective and individuals or groups with 
competing power.
Co-operative Values: Reciprocity and Altruism
Let us look more closely at co-operative values. We can think of them 
in terms of “reciprocity” and “altruism.” In order for employees to behave 
co-operatively, they must at some stage be willing to experience a cost (or 
forego a benefit) in order to enable a benefit to apply to others. This may 
be in return for a direct benefit from someone else—this is “reciprocity.” 
Alternatively, it may be for “altruistic” purposes, for some less specific 
gain—for example a benefit to a collective to which the individual belongs, 
and which the individual might or might not benefit from—or for some 
notion of the “greater good.”
The mere existence of altruism is, for some, a puzzle because in 
crude evolutionary terms altruism should not exist. After Charles Darwin 
published On the Origin of the Species (1859) writers such as Thomas 
Huxley (1888) argued that biological evolution was based on  advancement 
through competition between individuals of the same species. Later,  Milton 
 Friedman and others used this to argue that a free market economic system 
was natural as it was based on “survival of the fittest” (de Waal, 2000; 
Watkins, 1998). Altruism is a paradox for such writers because “an altruistic 
act . . . decreases the fitness, that is, the chances of survival and reproduc-
tion of the actor, while increasing the fitness of a co-specific” (Krebs and 
May, 1976: 9, cited in Watkins, 1998). Eventually, altruism should have 
died out.
Yet recent and not-so-recent (Kropotkin, 1902) developments in 
 evolutionary theory indicate that altruism is not only an important survival 
mechanism but has played a key role in evolution. Altruism is found, 
for example, in: numerous birds, squirrels and monkeys that call out to 
warn their colleagues that a predator is nearby (at the risk of being eaten 
 themselves); fish, apes and feline and canine predators that collectively hunt; 
monkeys that collectively defend themselves against predators; vampire 
bats that share food with colleagues who have not eaten; and tropical fish, 
birds, bees and ants that forego the ability to breed in order to help feed and 
protect the progeny of others (Bshary, Wickler and Fricke, 2002; Dugatkin, 
1997; Kibbins, 2002; Okasha, 2003; Stewart, 2000; Werner et al., 2003). 
Various evolutionary theories explain these behaviours, based on concepts 
of “kin selection” (promoting your relatives’ progeny promotes genes that 
are similar to yours), “reciprocal altruism” (if you help someone who later 
helps you, the genes of both of you will be promoted), by-product mutualism 
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(you eat by cleaning a big fish and he doesn’t eat you) (Dugatkin, 1997; 
Okasha, 2003; Stewart, 2000) and, importantly, “group selection,” whereby 
co-operative groups out-perform groups of selfish individuals (Sober and 
Wilson, 1998; Wynne-Edwards, 1993). There are scale benefits from co-
operation: big co-operative groups also tend to out-perform smaller ones 
in nature (more food, fewer predators and easier raising of young) and the 
individuals in big groups have greater fitness than those in small groups 
(Clutton-Brock, 2002). An even more fundamental role for co-operation is 
given by Stewart (2000), who argues that all the great advances in evolution 
(bacteria into mitochondria, then single-celled animals into multi-celled 
animals, etc.) required co-operation. According to Stewart (2000: 7), “co-
operators will inherit the earth!”
Humans recognize the benefits of co-operative behaviour—more 
than any other species (Boyd and Richerson, 2002). Ancient people came 
together to form villages and societies to take advantage of the benefits of 
co-operative living. Tradesmen came together to form guilds to protect their 
trades and conditions. Workers came together to form unions, as they could 
not meet their objectives (including to survive) as individuals acting alone. 
Individual capitalists, whose capacity to expand their wealth was restricted 
if they acted alone, came together to form limited liability corporations.
Norms, Trust and the Free-rider Problem
There is a strong logic favouring co-operation. However it faces a 
 central problem: the “free rider” or “cheat.” In nature, a monkey that refuses 
to warn the group of an impending predator has less chance of being eaten 
than one who does. A chimpanzee who expends no effort or risk while the 
other members of the group collectively hunt, but then has equal access to 
the bounty, would have better chance than the others of passing on his genes. 
An individual free rider within a group of altruists will obtain the benefits 
without any of the costs of group membership, and outperform the altruists. 
 Without mechanisms for detecting and punishing free riders, the altruists 
would eventually die out. In the world of labour, non-unionists who free 
ride on the collective agreements won by unionists undermine the bargaining 
power of the collective, and strike breakers do so even more seriously.
Various behaviours necessarily emerge, then, to minimize  cheating. 
These behaviours may be shaped by the development of laws and institutions, 
or the development of appropriate norms of behaviour. A common way in 
which free riding is suppressed in nature, and in human organization, is 
through the punishment of free riders (cheats) by co-operators. Depending 
on the context, union rules, group pressure and social isolation may punish 
individuals who cheat on employee collectives.
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Norms favouring co-operative behaviour are a key element of enabling
altruism. Another key element is trust: “we are more comfortable co-
 operating with people who are likely to return any favours and to share 
the benefits of co-operation with us. So we co-operate more with family, 
friends and people we know we can trust” (Stewart, 2000: 26–7). The 
importance of trust is, in turn, reinforced through norms favouring trust 
and deploring cheating and free riding. The balance between norms and 
laws or institutions varies between cultures: Anglo-Celtic societies placed 
great emphasis on laws and regulations; Eastern societies placed great 
 emphasis on the development of cultural norms that favoured reciprocity and 
co-operative behaviour. These “cultural” differences have been referred to 
in the psychological literature as representing competing “individualistic” 
and “collectivist” cultures (Hofstede, 1984). Nonetheless, even relatively 
“individualistic” societies such as the USA could not function in the absence 
of norms that promoted a significant degree of trust and co-operation.
Collectives find their own ways of promoting norms of solidarity, 
and regulation to prevent free riding. It becomes socially unacceptable 
to “bludge” (free ride) or “scab” (do the job of a striker). A considerable 
amount of union membership literature has been devoted to the free- riding
problem (Booth, 1991; Cregan and Johnston, 1990; Crouch, 1982; Olson, 
1965). For example, Olson (1965: 88) argues that an individualistic rational 
employee “will not voluntarily contribute to a union providing a collective
benefit since he alone would not perceptibly strengthen the union, and since 
he would get the benefits of any union achievements whether or not he 
supported the union.” There are partial responses available to unions. For 
example, they may try to restrict the improvements in wages arising from 
union gains through collective bargaining (or, in Australia, awards) to union 
members. While superficially attractive, it is potentially quite dangerous,
since an increasing gap between union and nonunion wage costs also 
increases the incentive on employers to avoid unions, a significant factor in 
union decline in the US (Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992). Alternatively,
unions may provide additional benefits that are only available to  members—
protection against arbitrary discipline or unfair dismissal, and non-industrial 
services (in Australia, “Union Shopper”). While the former are important, 
the effects of market-competing services on union membership are disputed 
(Crouch, 1982; Kelly, 1990), with only work-related insurance (for example 
in regard to legal representation and unemployment and health insurance) 
significantly improving the propensity to join unions (Ben-Israel and Fisher, 
1992; Peetz, 1998; Visser, 1991; Western, 1993). Exclusive protections 
help explain why free riding is not terminal for unions, but they do not 
prevent free riding on the major benefits unions achieve through collective
bargaining. So, as with other groups, a very common way that unions have 
Peetz-pages709.indd 713   2006-02-01 12:31:41   
714 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2005, VOL. 60, No 4
responded to the free-rider problem is to ensure all the beneficiaries of 
unionism pay the cost involved in obtaining it.
As the labour movements matured, unions in some countries (includ-
ing Australia, New Zealand, Britain and the USA) used varying degrees 
of compulsory unionism as means of overcoming the free-rider problem. 
However, in large mature organizations compulsory unionism created its 
own pathologies. Unless the union had a strong workplace orientation, it 
tended to lead organizational leaders to become complacent, while (particu-
larly in Australia and New Zealand) losing accountability to the workplace 
membership, with compulsory unionism in Australia being associated with 
poor responsiveness to member concerns, inadequate connections with 
members, low workplace voice, and falling satisfaction with their union 
(Bramble and Heal, 1997; Peetz, 1998; Zappala, 1992). Thus one of the 
challenges for unions is how to overcome the tension between needing to 
ensure that all beneficiaries of collective organization contribute equitably 
to the cost of it, while avoiding the pathologies associated with compulsory 
unionism.
MEASURING FREE RIDING IN AUSTRALIA
In industrial relations, free riders are people who obtain the benefits of 
collective agreements without paying the associated costs. Measuring free 
riding is not quite so simple. Broadly speaking, two approaches have been 
taken. One approach, using official data, is to compare estimates of union 
density and collective bargaining coverage: the difference between them 
represents the incidence of free riding, and the ratio of the difference to 
collective bargaining coverage is the free riding ratio, that is, the proportion 
of agreement-covered employees who do not belong to a union (Wilkinson, 
Harbridge and Walsh, 2003). The second approach is to survey employees 
and ascertain if they are union members and are covered by a collective 
agreement. A variant on this second approach is to ask if they are union 
members and there is a union at their workplace which they are eligible to 
join—an approach that has been used in New Zealand (Haynes and Boxall, 
2004) where, at law, only union members can be covered by collective 
agreements,1 but in practice many employees on individual contracts in the 
same workplace enjoy exactly the same terms and conditions as are in the 
collective agreement covering their coworkers. This form of question has 
also been used in Australia (Teicher et al., 2006) though the institutional 
1. This means that, in New Zealand, the use of official coverage data is becoming less 
meaningful over time for estimating free riding in New Zealand (Boxall and Haynes, 
2004: footnote 2).
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framework (discussed below) is very different. Both methods have their 
limitations, so it makes sense to use data from each source to validate 
the other. The survey approach is reliant on employee perceptions and is 
 generally subject to higher sampling errors because of resource constraints. 
It may overstate free riding if the denominator is all employees who have 
the opportunity to belong to a union, if their terms and conditions are not 
determined by a union agreement. The official coverage data approach 
assumes that all union members are covered by collective agreements, and 
that all collective agreements are union-negotiated. In Australia, neither of 
these assumptions are entirely valid.
At the time of writing, Australian employees could be covered by a 
range of instruments: (1) an award, an order issued by an arbitral tribunal 
that sets down minimum terms and conditions in an industry, occupation 
or enterprise; (2) a union collective agreement, negotiated by a union and 
registered under state or federal legislation; (3) a non-union “collective”
enterprise agreement, in which a majority of employees at a workplace 
or enterprise vote in favour of an agreement and it is registered under 
what was s170LK of the federal Workplace Relations Act 1996 (WR Act);
(4) an Australian Workplace Agreement (AWA), an individual contract 
also formalized under the WR Act; or (5) an unregistered individual 
 contract, which might or might not have an award underpinning it. At 
law, the minimum value to workers of the pay and conditions in collective
agreements and individual arrangements was determined by the net value 
of awards, through the operation of a requirement known as the “no dis-
advantage test.” In mid 2004, 20 per cent of employees were covered by 
awards, approximately 36 per cent were covered by union collective agree-
ments, another 2 per cent by collective agreements that were unregistered 
but would generally be presumed to be union agreements, 3 per cent by 
s170LK non-union enterprise agreements, 2 per cent by AWAs and 31 per 
cent by unregistered individual contracts. (The remaining 5 per cent were 
owner-managers of incorporated enterprises.) (ABS, Cat. No. 6306.0; Peetz, 
2006). Unfortunately, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) does not 
distinguish between union and non-union collective agreements. In addition, 
while most union members are covered by enterprise agreements, a small 
proportion are reliant on awards or other instruments.
There are also some conceptual issues in assessing free riding. What if a 
non-member thinks that the benefits of union membership are not worth the 
cost? Is he free riding? What if a non-member does not believe in unions? 
Is he free riding? Drawing on Sobel (1995), Haynes and Boxall (2004) 
distinguish between “technical free riders,” who may be in a position to 
join a union but do not, and “calculating free riders,” who are motivated 
at least in part by a desire to obtain a benefit without paying a cost. The 
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approach taken here, however, is simpler. Even with this distinction, both 
groups free ride in obtaining a benefit without paying a cost.
The Magnitude of Free Riding in Australia
A survey-based estimate of free riding in Australia comes from a 
 telephone survey of 1000 employees in 2003–04 undertaken by Teicher et 
al. (2006). It showed that 39 per cent of workers who could be represented 
by a union that had a presence in their workplace were not themselves union 
members. When these non-members were asked to give a reason or reasons 
why they did not belong to a union, 52 per cent agreed that, amongst other 
reasons they may have given, they saw no point in joining “because I get all 
the benefits anyway.” Some of these free riders also gave other justifications, 
for example union fees were too high or people doing their type of job did 
not usually join a union, but they were still obtaining many of the benefits of 
union membership without paying the costs (Teicher et al., 2006).
Estimates from coverage data show surprisingly similar results. After 
deducting section 170LK agreements, ABS data from 2004 implied that 
approximately 35.6 per cent of employees gained the benefits of registered 
union-negotiated agreements (ABS, Cat. No. 6306.0). Trend analysis (to 
minimize the effects of sampling variability) of ABS union membership 
data from the same year show that only about 22.8 per cent of employees 
were members (ABS, Cat. No. 6310.0; Peetz, 2005). The gap—what can 
be called net free riding—is equivalent to 12.8 per cent of employees, or 
36 per cent of those covered by registered union collective agreements. 
When we take account of the fact that there are some union members who 
do not have collective agreement coverage (for example, in hospitality, 
construction and wholesaling), and some others are employees covered by 
unregistered union collective agreements, it is likely that close to two-fifths 
of workers gaining the benefits of union-negotiated collective agreements 
are not union members. This is comparable to the estimate from the survey 
by Teicher et al. (2006).
Net free riding has been increasing in Australia. Collective bargaining
coverage has been rising while union coverage is falling. Between 2000 
and 2004, in trend terms the proportion of employees who were union 
members fell from 24.8 per cent to 22.8 per cent, while estimated union 
registered collective agreement coverage rose from 33.2 per cent to
35.6 per cent. By implication, the minimum number of non-members 
 gaining the benefits of union agreements rose quite substantially from
25 to 36 per cent of employees under union collective agreements.
Data on employee coverage of non-union “collective” agreements 
by industry are not published, so to have a more disaggregated look at 
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free riding using coverage data we are forced to resort to “apparent free 
riding,” which includes non-union agreements in the denominator. This 
overstates net free riding by an average of 4 to 5 percentage points, and 
probably leads to exaggeration of inter-industry variation in free riding, as 
the number of s170LK agreements is proportionately higher in industries 
with lower collective bargaining coverage (calculated from DEWR/OEA 
2004 and ABS, Cat. No. 6306.0). That said, the extent of inter-industry 
variation in apparent free riding, shown in Table 1, suggests that industry-
specific factors make a difference. In both 2000 and 2004 (and in 2002, 
not shown) free riding was higher in industries with higher collective 
agreement coverage, a finding consistent with the New Zealand experience 
using coverage data (Wilkinson, Harbridge and Walsh, 2003). It appeared 
to be worst in several predominantly public sector industries—government 
administration and defence, education, communication services—as well as 
in finance and insurance (where it is highest), culture and recreation, and 
retailing. Indeed, in the public sector as a whole apparent free riding in 
2004 was 50 per cent, compared to 36 per cent in the private sector. On the 
other hand, the table suggests that the relationship between free riding and 
union density appears to be unstable, depending on the year for which data 
were observed, a pattern also having some similarity with New Zealand’s 
(Wilkinson, Harbridge and Walsh, 2003).
In some low-coverage industries the number of union members was 
actually greater than the number covered by agreements, indicating that 
many union members in weakly organized industries (often with small 
workplaces) were unable to negotiate collective agreements. In the highly 
casualized hospitality industry (accommodation, cafes and restaurants) where 
unions have low density and difficulty negotiating collective agreements, in 
2000 at least two-fifths of union members did not have  collective  agreement 
coverage. Many childcare workers would be in a similar situation. In 
construction, where about one in six union members are not covered by 
a collective agreement, a different explanation is likely. Here “negative 
free riding” probably reflects the project-based nature of the industry: near
100 per cent unionization rates prevail on many larger project sites, while 
some union members between large project jobs will find themselves work-
ing on smaller project sites that lack EBA coverage. In other industries there 
would also have been union members without agreement coverage, but 
their numbers were fewer than those of the free riders. Apparent free rid-
ing increased in all industries, but the increase was higher in the industries 
with lower density and lower collective bargaining coverage, suggesting
that growth in free riding was associated with union weakness, and
perhaps a low sense of collective efficacy. Supporting this, 49 per cent of 
 technical free riders in the survey by Teicher et al. (2006) gave, as a reason 
for non-membership, that the union does not achieve anything they value.
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Apparent free riding amongst casuals was very high, at 71 per cent in 
2004, reflecting the difficulties unions have in recruiting casual employees. 
Driven principally by the relationships between casualization, part-time 
employment and gender, apparent free riding was 58 per cent among 
part-time employees and 50 per cent amongst women.
Overall, it would appear that almost two-fifths of Australian employees 
covered by collective agreements “free ride.” The growth of free riding also 
has a longer term dimension. Up until the 1990s, the main basis for wage 
determination in Australia was awards of tribunals (often supplemented 
by local, informal collective agreements). Awards were only made and 
maintained in response to application and effective advocacy from unions 
(with, from time to time, supportive industrial action). Without unions, 
workers would not have received the benefits of awards. In 1990, 80 per 
cent of employees were covered by awards; 41 per cent belonged to a union. 
In 2004, 60 per cent of employees were covered by awards or collective 
agreements underpinned by awards (and another indeterminate number 
were on individual contracts underpinned by awards) but only 23 per cent 
belonged to a union. Free riding on union-driven awards rose from 49 per 
cent to at least 62 per cent.
CO-OPERATIVE VALUES IN DECLINE?
The containment of free riding depends on the maintenance of values 
and institutions that discourage or preclude it, so does the growth of free 
 riding represent the decline of co-operative values and the ascendancy of 
individualism? Or does it reflect institutional changes? The  Business  Council 
of Australia (BCA), a decade and a half ago, claimed that Australians 
needed to adjust their thinking about public policy because employee values 
and preferences had shifted away from collectivism to an individualistic 
framework (BCA, 1989). So let us consider the evidence. An influential 
argument implying the decline of co-operative values was made by Robert 
Putnam (2000) who looked at US opinion poll data on “social trust” (and 
other indicators of “social capital”) over several decades. Since then he has 
observed a sharp reversal of most of the trends he previously described fol-
lowing the events of 11 September 2001 (Putnam, 2002). That aside, it is 
far from clear that Putnam’s American results could be  generalized to other 
industrialized nations. For example, “Canadians continue to manifest a spirit 
of social solidarity and commitment to social spending and programmes 
that is very high” (Mendelsohn, 2002: 32).
In Australia, evidence on popular ideology is mixed but overall  suggests 
that, at a broad level, individualistic values are not inherently favoured over 
co-operative values and, if anything, the shift has been away from, not 
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towards individualism, with increasing numbers of Australians supporting
redistributive social policies (Peetz and Murray, 2003). In 1979 a major 
national survey found that, given a choice, 59 per cent of Australians 
thought that government should reduce taxes, whereas only 36 per cent 
thought it should spend more on social services—a gap of 23 percentage 
points (Aitkin, 1982: 385). Over two decades later, a directly comparable
survey showed the gap had disappeared—only 35 per cent favoured  cutting 
taxes, while slightly more people, 37 per cent, favoured spending more on 
social services (AES, 2001; see also Wilson and Breusch, 2003). When 
the wording of the question is amended slightly to give an example of 
what is meant—to give a choice between “reducing personal income taxes 
or increasing social spending on services like health and education” the 
margin is 48 per cent in favour of more social spending and just 28 per 
cent in favour of lower taxes (AuSSA, 2003). These data represented the 
opposite of a shift away from altruistic towards individualist sentiments—a 
particularly notable finding when you consider that taxes were higher in 
2001 than in 1979 (ABS, Cat. No. 5506.0).
Surveys have also indicated widespread disquiet about the declining 
sense of social solidarity shown in trends in the distribution of income.
A Newspoll survey showed that 83 per cent of Australians agreed
(just 13 per cent disagreed) that the rich are getting richer and the poor are 
getting poorer, and while 55 per cent of Australians thought the distribution 
of wealth across Australian society had become less fair, just 10 per cent 
thought it had become more fair. Nor was this warranted by any economic 
payoff: given two options, 70 per cent said they would rather the gap between 
the rich and the poor get smaller, only 28 per cent preferred the overall 
wealth of Australia to grow as fast as possible (Newspoll, 2000). Between 
1987 and 2004, the proportion of surveyed Australians who agreed that
income and wealth should be redistributed to ordinary people rose from
46 per cent to 51 per cent, while the proportion disagreeing fell from 34 per cent to
20 per cent (McAllister and Mughan, 1987; AES, 2004). People who
favour redistributive policies are more likely to support collective 
 organization of workers (Deery and De Cieri, 1991; Grimes, 1994; Peetz, 
1998).
Finally, as a general philosophy, Australians show a strong leaning 
towards collectivist rather than individualistic objectives: in the 2001 study 
58 per cent agreed that Australia should be “a unified body pursuing a 
common goal,” while just 19 per cent thought it should be a “collection of 
people independently pursuing their own goals” (AES, 2001). Similarly, in 
2003 only 30 per cent favoured the statement “living standards in Australia 
would be best improved if each individual looked after his or her own inter-
ests first” while 49 per cent preferred the opposite view: “living standards 
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in Australia would be best improved if we looked after the community’s 
interests first” (AuSSA, 2003).
The data do not support the view that, in general, individualistic 
 attitudes are increasingly swamping co-operative ones. Nor is the evidence 
of any shift to individualism any more convincing if we look specifically at 
attitudes towards industrial relations issues. In 1996, before the introduction 
of AWAs, 34 per cent of Australians agreed that individual contracts were 
better than enterprise agreements, while 30 per cent disagreed (AES, 1996). 
Seven years later attitudes were not so rosy. Although a majority said that 
“employees and employers should be able to negotiate pay and conditions 
directly,” this did not translate into support for individual contracts, as
46 per cent agreed that “individual contracts favour the employer over the 
employee” while only 18 per cent disagreed. Some 43 per cent agreed that 
“employees will never protect their working conditions and wages without 
strong unions,” while just 32 per cent disagreed, and 66 per cent agreed that 
“award wages are the best way of paying workers and setting conditions,” 
with only 13 per cent disagreeing (AuSSA, 2003). Since the 1980s, attitudes 
have become steadily more pro-union, when measured by responses to such 
questions as whether unions: have too much power; have been a good thing 
for the country; should be subject to tighter controls; are doing a good job; 
or have trustworthy leaders. For example, the proportion of Australians 
saying unions were doing a “fairly good,” “very good” or “excellent” job 
rose gradually from around 35 per cent in the mid 1980s to 50 per cent in 
the mid 1990s (Peetz, 1998). Newspoll data also show attitudes to unions 
becoming more favourable between 1996 and 2004, with half of workers 
now preferring to belong to a union than not belong (Bearfield, 2003; Rob-
ertson, 2005). Australian values on work-related matters are becoming more 
collectivist, not less. Similarly in 2002 in the USA, for the first time since 
the data were collected, more than half of non-unionists would vote for a 
union in a certification ballot if given the chance (Freeman, 2005).
In substance, then, the evidence suggests that values have not swung 
towards individualism. Similarly, both ABS data and data from time-use 
surveys show that volunteering behaviour in Australia increased through the 
1990s (ABS Cat. No. 4441.0; Patulny, 2004: 16; Wilkinson and Bittman,
2002). Co-operation has been a core feature of evolutionary and social 
advance. It relies upon the prevention of cheating and the promotion of 
norms that promote altruistic behaviour. In general there is no evidence 
of any decline in co-operative norms. Indeed, general social attitudes are 
becoming more favourable towards progressive co-operative behaviour. 
This is clearly the case in employment relations, where attitudes are 
becoming more pro-union. Trends in volunteering behaviour also suggest 
the continuing strength of altruistic norms. To explain the growth in free 
riding we have to look elsewhere.
Peetz-pages709.indd Sec1:721   2006-02-01 12:31:41   
722 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2005, VOL. 60, No 4
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN AUSTRALIA
Let us turn to institutional changes. Through most of the twentieth 
 century, Australia had a tribunal-centred collectivist model in which key 
decisions regarding wages and employment conditions were made by 
 industrial tribunals in formal settlement of unresolved industrial disputes. In 
the 1990s public policy sought to change the nature of arbitration—in par-
ticular, preventing the federal tribunal from arbitrating in interest disputes.
Changes under a federal Labor Government to the wage system in the early 
1990s, through the shift to “enterprise bargaining,” sought to move wage 
fixing from a tribunal-centred collective model to a bargaining-centred col-
lective model at the state and federal levels. Subsequently the conservative 
government’s Workplace Relations Act 1996 emphasized a model that lacked 
both tribunals and collectivism. Arbitration now has a much narrower role 
than at any time over the preceding century. Union security arrangements 
have been rescinded at state and federal levels to prevent compulsory union-
ism or union preference. Regulation was changed at state and federal levels 
to permit non-union group agreement making and individual  contracting. In 
the 1990s, governments passed laws in the Australian states (in order: New 
South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and 
Queensland) and in the federal jurisdiction (which covered 40 per cent of 
workers) that prohibited compulsory membership of unions and promoted 
non-union “bargaining” including individual contracting. These laws con-
tributed to the drop in union membership in three ways. First, unwilling 
conscripts no longer had to belong to a union. Second, it became easier 
for corporations to discourage union membership. Third, free riding was 
no longer constrained. Indeed, because there was no way that co-operators 
could impose sanctions on free riders, these changes actively encouraged 
free riding. Union density fell—most rapidly in those states that had recently 
introduced these changes—and free riding grew. These were not the only 
factors in union decline: other important factors were structural changes 
in the labour market, a change in strategies by employers towards unions 
(aimed in part at removing compulsory unionism), and union weakness at 
the workplace level (Peetz, 1998).  Nonetheless, the impacts of institutional 
changes on unionism and free riding were real and substantial.
The developments of the 1990s need to be seen in the context of the 
role industrial relations policy has played at the frontier of class political 
struggle in Australia. More so than in Canada, industrial relations policy 
in Australia has been subject to radical shifts in legislation as a result of a 
greater sense of the efficacy of changing legislation. This in turn probably
reflects several factors: the greater centralization of processes and outcomes 
due to the existence of the award system and the importance of the federal 
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jurisdiction, meaning that institutional changes have a bigger impact on 
workplace practice; the absence of an Australian equivalent of Quebec, 
meaning less priority is given to issues of national unity and to avoiding 
nationally divisive policies, as there is no real fear of the federation  breaking 
apart; and the strongly class-based nature of Australian political parties, 
meaning that for conservative parties an attack on trade unionism is also 
an attack on their political opponents.
CANADIAN SOLUTIONS
The Canadian solution to the cheating problem is the Rand formula, 
which applies in the federal jurisdiction and some provincial jurisdictions. 
The Rand formula (named after a chief justice who settled a pivotal strike 
in the automobile industry in 1945–46) provides for non-unionists in a 
unionized workplace to pay the equivalent of dues to the union. The original 
strike concerned a union claim for a closed-shop provision in a proposed 
agreement, in the context of concern that the employer would use the flood 
of returning ex-servicemen to deunionize the company. The employer 
strongly resisted, claiming the employer’s right to hire and fire would be 
handed over to the union. The bitter and expensive strike was settled by 
arbitration. Rand, CJ determined that union should not be endowed with 
the power to shape hiring policies, but that it was desirable for a stable 
industrial relations system for unions to have security once recognized. The 
Rand formula dealt with the free-rider problem and gave unions security of 
income, and in turn required unions to uphold the terms of the collective 
contract. Support for or acquiescence to illegal strikes (which up until then 
had been a common feature of Canadian industrial relations) could lead to 
the arrangement being withdrawn. In 1948, the federal Industrial Relations
and Disputes Investigation Act was introduced to, inter alia, permit 
 agreements to deal with union security issues (Russell, 1990: 220–230). In 
1951, about 19 percent of unionized employees in Canadian manufacturing 
were covered by the Rand formula. By 1991, 43 per cent of all Canadian 
employees in workplaces with 500 or more employees were covered by 
Rand, with another 45 per cent covered by other union security provisions 
such as union shops (Russell, 1990 and pers. comm.).
As the Rand formula spread through the Canadian system the  incidence 
of illegal strikes declined (Russell, 1990). Following a 1968 report of 
a Task Force on Industrial Relations (the Woods Report), the federal 
laws were changed to give explicit recognition to the Rand formula as a 
bargaining item. In 1984 further amendments made the Rand formula in 
effect mandatory in the federal jurisdiction. Several provincial  jurisdictions 
also require Rand clauses in all collective agreements, including Ontario, 
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Quebec, British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland 
 (Akyeampong, 2000: 38; Arthurs et al., 1993: 247). In most of these, 
employees can seek exemption where they have religious objections 
to  joining a union or paying regular union dues, provided they pay an 
 equivalent amount to an agreed charity (s. 1 of the Canadian Federal 
Labour Code). If the employee and union cannot agree on a charity, the
Labour Relations Board can nominate one. Sincere but non-religious 
 convictions are not adequate to obtain this exemption. In other  provincial
jurisdictions, unions can negotiate Rand provisions but they are not 
 mandated, though employers must provide automatic dues check-off 
where requested by the union (Arthurs et al., 1993: 248). The Supreme 
Court of Canada in 1991 determined that Rand-formula provisions were 
not  inconsistent with guarantees of freedom of association set out in the 
 Charter of Rights and Freedoms.2 Free riding is a minor and declining 
issue in Canada, with net free riding (based on official coverage data) 
 falling from 9 per cent to 7 per cent between 1997 and 1999 (Akyeampong,
2000: 37).
Canada is not alone in its use of this system, also referred to as “agency 
shops.” South Africa introduced the capacity for agency shops in 1995
(Orr, 2001). They have been used in a number of American states. Collective 
bargaining and representation are not the only use to which union resources 
are put, and so various US court cases have placed limitations on what 
funds raised through agency shop arrangements can be used for (Orr, 2001).
Some US states have legislated to set a ceiling to the level of fees that can 
be charged—for example, at around 85 per cent of union dues in New Jersey 
and Minnesota public employment (Ali Raza and Anderson, 1996, cited in 
Orr, 2001). Some New Zealand unions, which act for non-members as a 
bargaining agent on a fee-for-service basis, charge an amount for this that is 
substantially less than normal union membership dues. In Canada, though, 
agency fees are essentially set at the level of union fees.
AUSTRALIAN APPLICATION?
Taking their inspiration from the Rand formula, from the late 1990s 
some Australian unions sought to introduce “agency fees” or “bargaining 
services fees” into enterprise agreements. Under agreements with such 
clauses, employees who were not union members were required to pay a 
fee to the union that negotiated the agreement by which they were covered. 
One of the notable features was that several Australian unions sought to go 
2. Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, cited in Arthurs 
et al. (1993: 247).
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well beyond the Canadian provisions, by charging an agency fee that was 
higher than the annual union fee (Lee, 2004).
In Australia, a portion of union fees fund other activities that are 
more concerned with providing protection or benefits for individual union 
 members (in relation to grievances, unfair dismissal, insurance, etc.). Indeed, 
protective services such as these, where free riding is not possible, are often 
the most common reason people give for belonging to a union (Gallagher 
and Strauss, 1991; Millward, 1990; Van de Vall, 1970). The claim could 
therefore easily and correctly be made that a requirement that non-members 
pay a fee equal to union dues would represent a cross-subsidy from non-
members to members. A higher fee would arguably represent a form of de 
facto compulsory unionism. While the primary rationale is to prevent free 
riding, through the cross-subsidy by union members of non-members, there 
are also arguments that fees should not be so high as to create a reverse 
cross-subsidy. Moreover, excessive bargaining fees would encourage inertia 
on the part of unions, by reducing or removing the incentive to recruit 
members and to provide adequate support for members in workplaces with 
agreements—the pathologies of compulsory unionism. It would encourage 
what Stewart (2000), in an evolutionary context, refers to as “exploitation” 
of the group by its “managers.” This suggests that it is desirable that there 
be a discount applied against the union dues in calculating an agency fee, 
as applied in some American states. This would also avoid expectations by 
non-members paying agency fees that the union would represent them in 
non-bargaining contexts. On the other hand, the costs incurred by members 
in obtaining favourable collective agreements often go beyond the fees they 
pay, and may include lost income during industrial conflict. This suggests 
that any discount in agency fees should not be too large. For Australian 
unions, however, the idea of a discount was irrelevant as they instead sought 
to charge a premium. Agency fees thus had the appearance of being a de 
facto form of compulsory unionism, and were subject to much criticism.
Agency fees received ambivalent treatment from state and federal 
 tribunals (O’Neill and Shepherd, 2003; Lee, 2004). The Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission (AIRC) initially approved agreements containing 
an agency fee charged by the Communications, Electrical and Plumbing 
Union (CEPU) and set above the relevant union fees, despite intervention 
to oppose it by a government agency.3 This decision was upheld by a full 
bench of the AIRC, though it raised questions about whether agency fees 
pertained to the employment relationship, to which enterprise agreements, 
3. Re: Accurate Factory Maintenance Labour Hire Enterprise Agreement 2000-2003,
McIntyre VP, AIRC, 9 February 2001, PR900919.
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under federal legislation, were restricted.4 Later, when the Federal Court 
considered whether an agency fee validly pertained to the employment 
relationship (for the purposes of enabling immunity from civil action during 
industrial action to secure a new collective agreement), the court concluded 
that it did not.5 Meanwhile the federal government had attempted to change 
the WR Act in 2001 to prohibit agency fees, but was frustrated by the Sen-
ate, where the party holding the balance of power, the Australian Democrats, 
expressed their support for both “fee-for-service” and freedom of association 
(Murray, 2001). In 2003, however, the Democrats reversed their position 
and allowed passage of the Commonwealth Workplace Relations Amend-
ment (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Act 2003, which rendered 
agency fees invalid and prohibited their further use in the federal jurisdic-
tion. The passage of this legislation by the Senate (which had rejected most 
other conservative industrial relations legislation from 1997 to 2004) was 
encouraged by the high level at which agency fees were being set. Some 
state tribunals, however, continued to permit agency fees in certain circum-
stances, including an agreement that allowed a bargaining fee set at 80 per 
cent of the union fee to be charged (originally rejected because it set the 
agency fee at the same rate as the union membership fee).6 In late 2004, the 
status of bargaining fees in the federal jurisdiction was definitively dealt 
with in the Electrolux case by the High Court, which ruled they were invalid 
because they were not directly relevant to the employment relationship.7
At the time of writing, the federal government had introduced legislation 
to override state tribunals’ capacity to allow bargaining fees.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A co-operative animal community in which around two-fifths of 
 members were free riding on the work of the other three-fifths would be 
in serious trouble. The number of cheats would grow at the expense of 
co-operators until eventually co-operation stopped and the animal group 
collapsed. For unions, the problem can be lessened by providing selective 
benefits that are only available to union members, for example, represen-
4. Re: Accurate Factory Maintenance Labour Hire Enterprise Agreement 2000–2003 and 
other Agreements, AIRC, Print PR 910205, 12 October 2001.
5. Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v. Australian Workers Union [2001] FCA 1600
(14 November).
6. Ian Gregory Morrison Pty Ltd (SA) Patrol and Security Officers Enterprise Agreement 
2002-2004 (No 2) - Bargaining Agents Fee [2004] SAIRComm 15 (14 April).
7. Electrolux Home Products Pty Ltd v. Australian Workers’ Union [2004] HCA 40
(2 September).
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tation in disciplinary or unfair dismissal situations. However, while non-
members are able to gain the benefits of collective bargaining (which is, 
after all, the principal means of operation of unions) at no cost, free riding 
represents a significant danger for unions, with each new free rider directly 
weakening the bargaining strength of the remaining co-operators.
The growth of free riding in Australia is therefore a major problem for 
unions and for collective behaviour. It does not seem, however, that the 
growth of free riding reflects any decline in co-operative values. If anything, 
co-operative values have strengthened, particularly in regard to employment 
relations. Rather, changing institutional factors appear to be the culprits. 
Legislation and employers that are more antagonistic towards unions have 
removed the barriers to punishing cheats and promoted free riding. An 
 effective public policy response to cheating has been developed in Canada. 
This is not the case in Australia, and more innovative changes in public 
policy and union practice, building on the concept of social  obligation, 
may be necessary to reduce the problem of cheating and promote good 
 citizenship amongst the industrial citizens.
Beyond agency fees, it may be possible to develop alternative models 
which minimize the incentive to free ride. One would be to permit the 
 inclusion in agreements of “social obligation fees”—provisions which 
required employees covered by the agreement to make a contribution to a 
voluntary organization of the employees’ choice. These would be roughly 
analogous to the charity exemption allowed for conscientious objectors to 
the Rand levy (and to conscientious objectors to union membership in the 
Australian federal jurisdiction in earlier decades), but importantly there 
would be no requirement to prove conscientious objection, merely an 
instruction as to where employees’ social obligation fees should be directed. 
That recipient organization could be a trade union to which the employee 
belonged (in which case it would represent a credit towards their union 
fee) or a charity or other voluntary association. The level of contribution
should be set at a rate lower that union fees, reflecting the private benefits
accruing to union members (the benchmark of roughly 80 per cent estab-
lished in some state jurisdictions in the US and Australia would be a use-
ful starting point for setting an appropriate rate). Unions would be able 
to waive the fee for members or credit it against membership fees. There 
would be no incentive on employees to free ride on union gains, but equally 
there would be no compulsion to join the union and employees who were 
 philosophically opposed to joining a union or who were simply unhappy 
with union performance would be entirely free not to join or contribute to 
a union. Such provisions probably would be outside the scope of federal 
agreements as they would probably not be considered a matter for the 
employment relationship until federal legislation were changed (most likely 
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by a government of different philosophical persuasion), but they would not 
fall foul of “freedom of association” principles.
That all said, there are limits to how far state policy can enable unions 
to deal with free riding. A close reading of the survey and coverage data 
suggest that part of the free-rider problem reflects beliefs that union power is 
inadequate to achieve the results potential members would want. In the end, 
for unions to secure significant growth in membership in workplaces where 
they have a union presence and collective agreement, they will need to 
 persuade potential members of their power, and this comes down to effective 
application of organizing principles (Crosby, 2005; Kelly and Badigannavar, 
2004; Lévesque and Murray, 2002). Only when they have the confidence of 
a strong majority of the workforce at a workplace would agency fees come 
into play as a viable approach for addressing free riding.
As in nature, the key issue for the prevention of cheating is to ensure 
that free riders do not gain from their cheating, either by enjoying the 
benefits of collective gains or by not experiencing the resource cost of 
contributing to the collective effort. Social obligation fees satisfy these 
requirements, while reducing the scope for “managers” to exploit the 
group over which they have control, instead requiring them to promote 
and coordinate co-operation amongst the members of the group to best 
advance the interests of those members (Stewart, 2000: 58). With freedom 
of “disassociation” principles entrenched in the Australian polity, creative 
approaches to resolving the free-rider problem are required.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les valeurs coopératives, les institutions et le problème du 
resquillage en Australie : peut-on apprendre du Canada ?
La citoyenneté industrielle comporte à la fois des droits et des 
 responsabilités pour les citoyens. Ceux-ci englobent le droit de participer 
à une activité collective, telle que la négociation et le besoin de se sentir 
responsable envers des membres d’une collectivité ou d’un groupe. Un 
des principaux problèmes inhérents à la coopération et à l’action collective
est celui du resquillage, c’est-à-dire du fait de bénéficier des avantages 
d’une action collective sans apporter sa quote-part, plus précisément, en 
relations du travail, de bénéficier des avantages de la convention collec-
tive sans payer de cotisations syndicales. Cet essai traite des valeurs de 
la  coopération,  discute du problème du resquillage (free riding) et des 
changements institutionnels en Australie où, au cours des dernières années, 
ce problème a pris de l’ampleur. Il fait aussi ressortir le contraste avec le 
Canada, où la formule Rand a été introduite pour contrer le resquillage 
en relations du travail et cet arrangement pourrait fournir à l’Australie un 
modèle à imiter.
Le collectivisme renvoie à la façon dont les intérêts, les orientations
et les comportements trouvent en grande partie leurs assises dans un
groupe plutôt que dans les individus pris séparément. Les attitudes propres 
Peetz-pages709.indd Sec1:733   2006-02-01 12:31:43   
734 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 2005, VOL. 60, No 4
au  collectivisme comprennent trois éléments principaux : la conscience 
d’une identité sociale commune, des valeurs de coopération partagées (ce 
qui est le sujet de cet essai) et un sens de l’efficacité collective (une  croyance 
en un pouvoir) chez les membres d’un groupement. On peut concevoir
les valeurs de coopération en termes de réciprocité et d’altruisme. Même 
si, pour quelques-uns, l’altruisme peut sembler un paradoxe, la théorie 
de l’évolution nous incite à penser qu’il est non seulement un important 
 mécanisme de survie, mais aussi qu’il a joué un rôle clef dans l’évolution. 
Plus que beaucoup d’autres espèces, les humains reconnaissent les  bienfaits
d’un  comportement coopératif. Alors qu’il existe une logique solide en 
faveur de la coopération, elle doit cependant faire face au sérieux problème
que posent les resquilleurs, aussi appelés les parasites (free  riders). Sans 
mécanisme pour les identifier et les punir, l’altruisme risque de disparaître.
Il faut tenter d’atténuer cette forme de tricherie par l’adoption de lois 
et le développement d’institutions et de normes de comportement. Les 
 groupements doivent trouver des façons de promouvoir la solidarité et 
de contrer le resquillage. La réponse habituelle des syndicats à cet égard 
consiste à s’assurer que tous ceux qui bénéficient des avantages de la 
 syndicalisation en défraient les coûts. Un des grands défis des syndicats
est donc celui de surmonter les tensions entre ce besoin de s’assurer que 
ceux qui reçoivent des avantages de l’action collective y contribuent 
 équitablement, tout en évitant les malaises de l’adhésion syndicale 
 obligatoire.
Il existe en général deux approches pour évaluer l’ampleur du 
 resquillage. L’une d’elle utilise les données officielles pour comparer 
les évaluations de la densité syndicale et le champ d’application de la 
 convention collective. L’autre approche consiste dans la conduite d’enquêtes 
auprès des salariés pour vérifier s’ils sont membres de l’unité syndicale et 
s’ils sont couverts par la convention collective (ou, du moins, s’il y a un 
syndicat auquel ils peuvent adhérer dans leur lieu de travail). Selon ces 
deux approches, les deux cinquièmes des salariés en Australie, assujettis à 
une convention collective, seraient des non-membres parasites, avec une 
pointe dans le secteur public, chez les femmes et chez les salariés dans des 
emplois atypiques ou à temps partiel. Le nombre de ces parasites se serait 
également accru au cours des dernières années.
Le contrôle des resquilleurs dépend de la présence soutenue de valeurs 
et d’institutions qui pourraient décourager ou empêcher un tel comporte-
ment. Est-ce que la croissance du resquillage signifie le déclin des valeurs 
coopératives et la montée de l’individualisme, ou encore est-elle le signe 
de changements institutionnels ? En Australie, même si ce n’est pas très 
évident dans l’imagerie populaire, il semble qu’en général les valeurs de 
l’individualisme ne sont pas préférées à celles de la coopération et il est 
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fort possible qu’on se soit éloigné de l’individualisme au lieu de s’en être 
 rapproché. En fait, un nombre croissant d’Australiens appuie les  politiques de 
redistribution sociale. Pas plus qu’il n’existe une preuve d’un individualisme 
rampant, lorsqu’on considère plus particulièrement les attitudes à l’endroit 
des enjeux en relations industrielles, qui sont devenues plus favorables au 
syndicalisme au cours des dernières décennies. Dans la même foulée, on 
observe que le bénévolat s’est accru au cours des années 1990.
Les changements institutionnels rendent mieux compte du phénomène du 
resquillage. Les aménagements apportés à l’atelier syndical ont été rescindés 
au niveau fédéral et des provinces de façon à empêcher l’adhésion syndicale 
obligatoire ou la préférence syndicale. Ces lois ont contribué au déclin de 
l’effectif syndical de trois manières. En premier lieu, les recrues réfractaires 
n’ont plus à adhérer à un syndicat. En deuxième lieu, c’est devenu plus facile 
pour les entreprises de décourager l’appartenance à un syndicat. Enfin, le 
resquillage n’est plus restreint. En fait, parce qu’il n’existe plus de moyens 
chez les « coopérateurs » d’imposer des sanctions aux resquilleurs ou para-
sites, ces changements les ont plutôt encouragés. Les développements des 
années 1990 doivent être envisagés dans le contexte du rôle qu’ont joué les 
politiques de relations du travail à la frontière du conflit politique de classe 
en Australie. Plus qu’au Canada, les politiques en matière de relations 
industrielles ont connu un glissement radical au plan de la législation à cause 
d’une conscience plus aiguë de l’efficacité d’un changement législatif pour 
promouvoir un programme économique et politique.
La solution canadienne au problème des parasites a été l’adoption, 
dans les entreprises de juridiction fédérale et dans plusieurs juridictions 
provinciales, de ce qui est communément appelé la formule Rand (c’est-
à-dire l’obligation faite à l’employeur, par la législation ou la convention 
collective, de déduire de la rémunération de tous les travailleurs d’une unité 
de négociation, qu’ils soient ou non membres du syndicat, un montant égal 
à la cotisation syndicale et de le remettre au syndicat ou, selon certaines 
juridictions, pour des motifs religieux, à une organisation charitable). 
La Cour suprême du Canada a statué que les dispositions de la formule 
Rand n’étaient pas incompatibles avec la Charte canadienne des droits 
et des libertés. Le problème du resquillage est ainsi devenu un enjeu 
mineur en train de disparaître au Canada. D’autres expériences à l’échelle 
 internationale sont également instructives. L’Afrique du Sud a introduit 
la possibilité d’ateliers syndicaux en 1995. On retrouve ces derniers dans 
un certain nombre d’États américains. La représentation et la négociation
 collective ne sont pas les seules activités utilisant les ressources d’un 
syndicat; ainsi, de nombreuses décisions des cours de justice aux États-
Unis imposent des limitations à l’usage des fonds amassés par le biais des 
aménagements d’ateliers syndicaux.
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En s’inspirant de la formule Rand, quelques syndicats australiens depuis 
la fin des années 1990 ont tenté d’introduire des droits d’entrée d’atelier 
dans les accords d’entreprise (au niveau d’une corporation ou d’un lieu de 
travail). Des syndicats ont essayé d’établir des droits d’entrée d’atelier à un 
taux plus élevé que celui des cotisations syndicales, leur conférant ainsi de 
ce fait l’apparence d’une forme de syndicalisation obligatoire. Ils se sont 
vus servir un traitement mitigé de la part des cours et des tribunaux, jusqu’à 
ce qu’ils soient éventuellement arrêtés par une loi et par un avertissement 
de la Cour supérieure.
Par delà les cotisations d’atelier, il peut être possible de concevoir des 
régimes qui viennent minimiser l’incitation à jouer aux parasites. L’un 
serait la permission d’inclure dans les conventions des cotisations de type 
 « obligation sociale » : des dispositions qui exigeraient des salariés couverts 
par une convention collective de faire une contribution à une organisation 
volontaire au choix du salarié. Le montant de cette contribution devrait 
être fixé plus bas que celui des cotisations syndicales, reflétant ainsi les 
avantages privés qui s’accumuleraient chez les membres d’un syndicat. 
Ceci étant dit, on constate que le problème des resquilleurs reflète en grande 
 partie la faiblesse du pouvoir syndical. En bout de ligne, les syndicats 
 devront convaincre de leur pouvoir les membres éventuels; cela signifie 
qu’il faut appliquer de façon efficace les principes d’organisation  syndicale. 
Avec la liberté du principe de non-adhésion ancrée dans le régime politique 
australien, des approches créatrices à la solution de ce problème de non-
paiement des cotisations sont nécessaires.
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